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Abstract: In this philosophical paper, I make a case for the enduring utility of postmodernism as a lens through which to critique basic 
assumptions about knowledge and reality. I use this lens to tackle the contradictions built into so-called universal norms and values, which I 
argue are necessarily local and particular. This focus on the paradoxical structure of the universal informs my exploration of two related 
issues—the sense of practical paralysis, or inability to act, that seems to accompany postmodernism’s incredulity toward universals, and the role 
of the ethical educational policy researcher, paralysis notwithstanding. Accordingly, I problematize universalist claims about principles of 
human resilience as well as access to formal education, with an eye to the indefinite suspension of truth-claims. I contend that educational policy 
researchers have a responsibility to actively engage with the tensions of philosophical problems and conclude by suggesting what sorts of ethical 
imperatives might be cultivated by a responsible educational policy researcher in working to reconcile the so-called truths of science and the 
doubts of postmodern philosophy. 
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Introduction 
he central quandary that propels this paper was expressed well by Todd (2009) as “a pressing problem for 
philosophy of education and for the political orientation of education more generally, namely the question 
and status of the universal for addressing injustices” (p. 18). I concur with Todd that universalism and so-
called anti-universalism tend to surface as a problematic binary in the literature, much as I see the related concepts 
of modernism and postmodernism often approached unhelpfully with a polarizing brush. My focus on the structure 
and utility of the universal informs my exploration of two related issues—the sense of practical paralysis that seems 
to accompany the internalization of central tenets of postmodernism, and the concomitant role of the responsible 
educational policy researcher. A guiding theme that I thread through my argument is that of translation, not so much 
linguistic, but cultural and material. The phenomenological fabric of translation, I argue, reveals the construct of the 
universal to be holographic—a compelling mirage but nonetheless merely a reflection of its own reflection—which, 
when adequately realized, may elicit the paralysis noted above.  
 
Bazzul (2018) has aptly argued that “educators must take a politically critical look at what it means to be 
ethical in a time when there is active malice for many forms of life” (p. 470). Indeed, drawing on a clarification of 
the tenets of postmodernism and wrestling with the tensions woven into the paradox of universalism, I defend my 
view that educational policy researchers have a responsibility to actively engage with the tensions and frustrations of 
philosophical problems. Accordingly, I argue for the importance of the indefinite suspension of truth via constant 
dissensus and dialogue, and for cognizance of the inherently fictional, unrealizable structure of justice and other 
universal ideals. This argument is supported by a case study of the hazards of universalist claims to access to 
education as well as my own experience as a researcher-advocate working to improve the lives of vulnerable youth. 
I conclude by suggesting what sorts of ethical imperatives might be cultivated by a responsible educational 
researcher.  
Translation 
Hanson (1958) provided an extensive examination of the theory-laden nature of perception. A hypothetical problem 
analogous to the central one he posed would be whether you and I “see the same thing” when we watch a magic 
trick. This thought experiment progresses more clearly under the assumption that you know precisely how the trick 
is carried out, while I am completely dumbfounded (how on Earth did she survive being cut in half?!). Do we see 
the same thing? Well, we both receive the same photonic sense data, if from slightly different physical perspectives. 
But while you see a clever optical illusion, I see a woman being severed in two, smiling all the while. Clearly, we do 
not see the same thing. Here Popper’s (1994) claim that “there is no such thing as an uninterpreted observation, an 
observation which is not theory-impregnated” (p. 58) seems to ring true. 
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Merleau-Ponty (1962/2002) developed a complementary line of thought with his argument that perception is 
indeterminate by nature, that there are no objects prior to perception, and that perception instead begins in the body 
and ends in objects. This reversal requires a new concept, the pre-objective, counter to the subject-object distinction, 
in order to study the embodied process of perception. As Csordas (1990) wrote, elucidating Merleau-Ponty’s pre-
objective, “if our perception ‘ends in objects’, the goal ... is to capture the moment in which perception begins, and, 
in the midst of arbitrariness and indeterminacy, constitutes and is constituted by culture” (p. 9). By making an appeal 
to the pre-objective world, we avoid the fallacy of explaining a process (i.e., perception) by its product, pursuing 
instead a phenomenology of perception of the pre-objective world, a pure description of the genesis of original 
experience upon which our objective universe of descriptive discourse is founded (Kullman & Taylor, 1958; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962/2002).  
A pre-objective phenomenology is a noble but materially unfeasible ideal, as we cannot disentangle the object 
“in itself” from our messy human perception of it; we cannot “step outside” of ourselves and our subjectivities. This 
suggests that all observations, all perceptions, are intrinsically acts of translation. The word translation derives from 
the Latin translatio, or “to bring across” (Lewis & Short, 1879/1907). This fits with my interpretation of perception 
as the modal translation of sensory stimuli into cognitive structures, an act of translation that is theory- and culture-
laden, yes, but just as importantly, as unique as the embodied mind that carries it out. As Todd (2009) has argued, 
“many critics of universalism are not simplistically derisive of universality, but point to the ways in which claims to 
universality operate in and through particular logical systems, linguistic contexts, discourses and cultures” (p. 20), to 
which I would add “particular minds and bodies” to bolster Todd’s argument. Indeed, Bourdieu (1966/1974; 1977) 
has made the case that culture is a construct that is, in some sense, objectively embedded in subjective, individual 
bodies through habitus, an embodied, enduring set of dispositions (stylization, gestures, sensibilities, values, and 
tastes). This is an important claim that complements Todd’s (2009) interpretation that culture is also an exchange of 
languages and practices, “not some simplistic ruse conjured up by relativists to frustrate universalists, but the very 
cloth from which universal claims are tailored” (p. 20).  
Universality 
Drawing on Butler’s (in Butler, Laclau, & Žižek, 2000) analysis of universality, itself centered on its ontological 
grounding in cultural translation, Todd’s (2009) work sketched out the self-negating structure of universality: “In the 
name of seeking to rise above the particular in order to name what is common to all, universality paradoxically 
destroys what it purports to include” (p. 20), thus wedding universalism and anti-universalism into a nexus of 
contradiction. Todd has argued that all universalist claims are embedded in language and culture, and thus, as I have 
emphasized above, these claims entail interpretive conversions via embodied perceptions of materiality. This 
analysis captures the deep subjectivity inherent in all articulations of the universal, though not without adding 
another layer of paradoxical complexity with a totalizing statement about universals and their translational nature. 
Indeed, as Pendlebury and Enslin (2001) have contended, “there is no view from nowhere, no Archimedean point 
from which to approach research into people’s practices” (p. 363). This philosophical primer, however, did not 
prevent them from defending a universalist conception of ethics in educational research, nor did it hinder Enslin and 
Tjiattas (2009b) from attempting a qualified universalism with respect to access to education.  
My own doctoral study—currently in progress—is already illuminating the pitfalls of universalism, particularly 
when conducting research with vulnerable youth. I have taken my lead from Ungar (2004, 2007, 2011), who has 
studied resilience in at-risk youth for decades. Ungar (2011) has found that resilience research tends to over-rely on 
bipolar variables (e.g., good vs. bad; adaptive vs. maladaptive) and that this tendency makes it more difficult to 
accurately describe, conceptualize, and promote resilience. Accordingly, he has described atypical coping 
behaviours in vulnerable youth that may seem, on the surface, universally maladaptive—including drug use, suicide 
attempts, oppositional defiance, early school-leaving, and gang affiliation—but which may in reality translate as 
what he calls hidden resilience. His research with hundreds of at-risk young people has led him to recognize that an 
extreme, overtly deviant behaviour like gang membership can be perceived and experienced by youth as an indicator 
of social maturity, an appreciation for structure, and a system of beliefs promoting honour and duty (Ungar, 2004). 
My research with sexual and gender minority (LGBTQ) youth, many of whom have been thrust into homelessness 
after being rejected by their families for violating “universal” norms of heterosexuality, investigates sex work as an 
as-yet unexplored avenue of hidden resilience—for some youth, if not for others. Indeed, while some young men I 
have spoken with see their experience with sex work as nothing more than a degrading survival strategy, another 
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interviewee stated he took pleasure in the human connection and longed for the decriminalization of sex work in 
order to legitimize a trade that he sees as empowering, lucrative, and enjoyable.  
Whether youth experience sex work as empowering or degrading, the notion of young people trading sex for 
subsistence will no doubt make some readers uncomfortable. Nevertheless, Ungar’s (2004, 2007, 2011) research and 
my own demonstrate how the particularities of individual lived experience undermine a universalist conception of 
what is best for young people who are struggling to survive and thrive in a society that by and large does not accept 
them. My doctoral thesis, then, will not strive for the academic gold standard of generalizability, but rather to 
convey particular voices, however disparate, that are normally silenced in order to engender empathy and new 
perspectives in policy and practice. My reflexive methodology owes much to what can broadly be described as 
postmodernism, the central tenets of which I attempt to elucidate below. 
The Postmodernist Lens 
Yilmaz’s (2010) noble attempt to map out the meaning of postmodernism was a task complicated not only by the 
challenges of universalism outlined above (postmodernism will mean something different to everyone) but also, as 
Yilmaz showed, by the “anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist character of postmodernism” itself (p. 780). 
Metatheoretical convolutions notwithstanding, Yilmaz has posited postmodernism as a loose alliance of intellectual 
perspectives that challenge and critique modernism’s basic assumptions about knowledge and reality. I am 
especially compelled by Usher and Edwards’ (1994) wording, whereby postmodernism “is best understood as a state 
of mind, a critical, self-referential posture and style, a different way of seeing and working, rather than a fixed body 
of ideas, a clearly worked-out position or a set of critical methods and techniques” (p. 2). Hence, I think of 
postmodernism as a reflective lens through which we can choose to approach ethics, methodology, analysis, and 
other critical tasks. Observations and interpretations made through this lens lack the apparent clarity and fidelity of 
those made through, say, a positivist one; with our own image (subjectivity) reflected back at us, the representation 
of the outside world that is translated through the semi-translucent lens becomes difficult to resolve. Moreover, this 
murkiness can make it difficult to respond to perceived injustices, no matter how our gut may tell us how to proceed.   
Postmodernism has been characterized, in part, as “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 784) 
such as progress, development, and truth. As Yilmaz asserted, and as I have seen myself, this incredulity is often 
misinterpreted as outright denunciation or opposition, which can lead to the obstructive modernism/postmodernism 
binary. Yilmaz clarified that incredulity does not mean outright denial or rejection; it is instead an inability to 
believe. Considering its self-referential posture and incredulity toward metanarratives, then, we can see that 
postmodernism, as with Enslin and Tjiattas’ (2009b) “anti-universalism” (which they have claimed includes 
postmodernism), should not be interpreted as an alternative valence but as a critical lens or self-conscious 
translational filter.1 I explore the implications of this lens of incredulity in a later section, but first I explore some 
practical solutions to postmodern murkiness proposed by various scholars, under the broad theme of contestatory 
dialogue. 
The Suspension Bridge of Dissensus and Dialogue 
A common proposal forwarded by scholars in negotiating the tensions between the universal and particular—often 
under the heading of cosmopolitanism—is the continuous, conscious exercise of dialogue in order to arrive at new 
forms of understanding (Todd, 2010; Waghid, 2010; Waks, 2009). Todd (2010) has proposed an agonistic 
cosmopolitics as a critical framework for approaching cosmopolitanism, one that emphasizes the positive potential 
of constructive political conflict. This means that all participants in any policy debate, provided they come to the 
table with what she has called a “conflictual consensus” (p. 226) regarding the necessity of equality and freedom, 
should be regarded as legitimate adversaries who have the right to a political struggle to define the contents of 
liberty for themselves. This, of course, challenges us to pre-emptively conceptualize “equality and freedom” before 
engaging in debate, and this is a major hurdle indeed. I anticipate that in Todd’s view these conceptualizations 
would evolve over time through a nascent process of the agonistic cosmopolitics that she prescribes. Todd further 
                                                
1 Thank you to Jesse Bazzul for pointing me toward the works of Fredric Jameson, who has developed the notion of postmodernism as a cultural 
logic of late capitalism (Jameson, 1991). I do not have the space here to engage with Jameson’s intriguing Marxist position, and for the purposes 
of my argument, postmodernism is framed as an epistemic choice. I will more carefully consider this distinction in future writing.   
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argued that the end goal of consensus can be counterproductive, running the risk of negating the pluralism and 
diversity upon which our notions of democracy are founded:  
Learning to live better together requires facing the very difficulties embedded in that living, where not 
everyone’s voice sings to the same tune. This is definitely not to suggest that facing pluralism is only 
difficult, but merely that the contentiousness that inevitably arises out of different worldviews requires an 
approach that takes these views seriously. Otherwise we risk, in the name of high-handed principles, 
silencing those very voices that provide counterpoint and texture to the score of our interactions. (p. 227, 
italics in original) 
Companionably, Ingram (2016) wrote that cosmopolitanism is a practical orientation for political action that 
necessarily proceeds from the bottom up. Otherwise, it is co-opted as an ideology through which global elites project 
their own interests, preferences, and prejudices as universals, supposedly in the service of the greater good. This 
smuggling in of specific values under the guise of the universal is to be expected, Ingram claimed, since “universals 
always have to be enunciated by someone, somewhere, at some particular time, rendering them to that extent 
particular” (p. 71). Ingram’s radically democratic, contestatory approach to cosmopolitanism is not meant to offer 
solutions, but instead conveys the “essential lesson that, in most cases, cosmopolitanism must, however 
paradoxically, be local” (p. 76). Zanotti (2015) seemed to concur, claiming that the justification of ethical decisions 
with abstract norms diminishes the accountability of interveners, relieving them of their duty of judiciously 
weighing the appropriateness of abstract claims to the specifics of circumstance and of assessing the consequences 
of their actions. This assessment is a social process, rooted in dialogue and contestation (Zanotti, 2015).  
Such a call for legitimate dialogue is taken up by Crossley’s (2008) “bridging” thesis as well. Focusing on 
comparative education and the social sciences more generally, Crossley has argued that  
much can still be gained from a more effective bridging across paradigmatic and disciplinary boundaries; and 
between theoretical and applied studies; policy and practice; micro, macro and other levels of analysis; 
specialist and mainstream research traditions; studies of the past and those of the present; the humanities and 
the social sciences; and research in the North and the South. (p. 325) 
Crossley has worked toward a collapsing of binaries and otherwise seemingly disparate research entities, much as I 
have suggested in terms of (post)modernism and (anti-)universalism. Furthermore, his bridging thesis blurs 
paradigmatic boundaries but nevertheless resists consensus. Instead, “it prioritizes and values the ongoing creativity 
and originality that the juxtaposition of different world views may generate—as well as an improved awareness of 
the implications of cultural and contextual differences” (p. 331).  
Still, while Crossley’s (2008) advocacy of debate, dissensus, and context are a step in the right direction, I feel 
Popper’s (1994) work moves us into an even more philosophically sensitive appeal to dialogue, and one that models 
the posture of postmodernism that I have described. Popper has bought into “the growth of knowledge” while at the 
same time describing himself as “an almost orthodox adherent of unorthodoxy” (p. 34). I interpret this, in light of 
the arguments Popper developed throughout his chapter, as a strictly qualified subscription to the metanarrative of 
epistemological progress, a subscription that recognizes such growth as epiphenomenal, premised on disagreement, 
discussion, and mutual criticism. Further, he has demonstrated a profound sensitivity to the flux and particularity of 
the very conceptualizations of growth and knowledge. Popper’s postmodernist lens has revealed itself further in his 
thirst for understanding rather than agreement, as the latter is at best, he wrote, uninteresting, and at worst, fallacious 
and oppressive. For Popper, understanding is an ongoing process of critical dialogue (a term he has used 
interchangeably with rational discussion) and self-conscious reflection, whereby “truth” is held in constant 
suspension. Plus, his writing has been bitingly critical of Occidentalism—describing “indoctrination with Western 
ideas” and “training in Western verbosity and some Western ideology” as greater obstacles to critical dialogue than 
disparities in culture and language (p. 51). What I most admire in Popper, though, is his ability to engage with 
paradox and the complex, sometimes dizzying relations of concepts at various levels of abstraction. It is these sorts 
of intellectual headaches to which we now turn. 
Irony, Aporia & Supreme Fiction 
We have now explored critical dialogue, dissensus, and the bridging of paradigms as potential, if only partial, 
solutions to cosmopolitan conundrums. In my view, these frameworks are of limited utility, however, because they 
 
 
Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education  Volume 9, Issue 2  
Revue canadienne des jeunes chercheures et chercheurs en éducation Fall/Automne 2018 
 
 104 
fail to engage with the deep philosophical issues that arise in any exercise of universalism, issues that might be 
encapsulated by the descriptive phrase impossible and yet necessary. Namely, the roadmaps of others I have 
sketched out above tend to focus on the normative gravity, without engaging with the impossibility, of 
universalism—what I describe as its holographic nature. Enslin and Tjiattas (2009a) in particular have displayed a 
salient example of problematic philosophical agnosticism; in their rejoinder to Todd (2009), they admitted,  
much can still be gained from a more effective bridging across paradigmatic and disciplinary boundaries; 
and between theoretical and applied studies; policy and practice; micro, macro and other levels of analysis; 
specialist and mainstream research traditions; studies of the past and those of the present; the humanities 
and the social sciences; and research in the North and the South. (p. 325) 
Paraphrased: don’t tell me we can’t, for we clearly must. On the face of it, this is an admirable posture to take. And 
yet, I insist that to eschew the translational paradox highlighted by Todd (2009) risks putting research into the very 
trajectory of oppression and colonialism that Enslin and Tjiattas (and Pendlebury & Enslin, 2001) have sought to 
avoid. Quite simply, I contend that to take anything for granted when speaking for others is to tyrannize, no matter 
how benevolent one’s intentions. Enslin and Tjiattas were adept to suggest that this mantra might “pose the danger 
of paralysis” (p. 27). To ignore the paradox, however, would not be to commit a “politically incorrect 
misdemeanor,” as they claimed (p. 27), but a fundamental error that only serves to undermine their humanist project 
by infusing it with top-down privilege. Postmodern literature often seems to commit a similar error, namely 
emphasizing the impossible while ignoring the necessity. This is a common charge leveraged against postcolonial 
theorists by neo-Marxists as well (see Sankaran, 2009): there are widespread material inequalities and gross 
injustices—oppression, poverty, war, climate change—and no matter how much we are ethically or philosophically 
restricted in naming these conditions, no matter their material translational contingency, they are, in some deep 
sense, real and must be actively addressed in the here and now. How, then, are we to proceed in research, policy, 
and practice when our attempts to bring about positive change are agonizingly self-negating? 
The solution for me, if you can call it that, is to live in revolt, actively holding the contradictions in my 
consciousness as I conduct my research and, more generally, as I engage with the world. Having lived as an isolated, 
ashamed, closeted gay teen in the “Bible Belt” of Southern Alberta, my translation to graduate school embraced a 
mentality of activism as I sought to improve the lives of sexual and gender minority youth like me by tackling 
systemic inequality and under-recognition. Having had my eyes opened to the (post)structural, ethical challenges 
and contradictions built into this sort of work has not made the marginalization and victimization of this population 
any less real, nor has it diminished my resolve to make these kids’ lives better. What these philosophical realizations 
have done is to create a great deal more cognitive and emotional work for me as I endeavour to inform policy that 
speaks in generalities for an aggregate of unique individuals. Working with a postmodernist lens can be a real 
headache, as it brings with it a tidal wave of self-doubt, suspicion and, at times, hopelessness. This revolt is further 
manifest by the very act of my writing and publishing this paper, which could be criticized for its paradoxical 
attempt to universalize particularity while eschewing universalism. Similar critique has been leveled at one of the 
“fathers” of postmodernism, Jean-François Lyotard, whose works may not have adequately accounted for his 
totalizing account of anti-totality (Doyle, 1992). The progenitor of revolt as I use it, existential philosopher Albert 
Camus, likewise had to face the contradiction of writing a “meaningful” treatise on the absurdity (meaninglessness) 
of the universe (Camus, 1942/1955). Revolt for him was to live in “a constant confrontation between [himself] and 
his own obscurity... an insistence upon an impossible transparency [emphasis added]” (Camus, 1942/1955, p. 52).  
This insistence on the impossible, for me at least, is made more authentic—and the self-doubt more bearable—
by way of embracing Derrida’s notion of the aporia of justice, as developed by Friedrich, Jaastad and Popkewitz 
(2010). Derrida’s conception of democracy, as Friedrich et al. have described it,  
lies in the opening of the space to experience the aporia of justice, of deciding on the undecidable allowing 
for an experience of the impossible and the attribution of responsibility in terms of an ethic of ‘affirmative 
openness to the other prior to questioning. (p. 583, italics in original)  
Thus, due to the “universality” of translation that I defended above, democracy and justice will never come, as their 
manifest meanings and instantiations are always in flux. Once we capture and name them, they become something 
else, something domineering and self-destructive. To quote Todd (2009): “This is, then, a universality forever 
dissatisfied with itself, forever restless in its search for meaning, and it lives only at the very limits of its own 
articulation” (p. 22). This notion is affirmed by Ingram (2016), who has claimed that universalism can only remain 
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that—universal—when it basks in its own impotence: “It only stops being an empty dream when a power exists to 
make it effective, but then the recourse to this power inevitably particularizes it and puts it at the disposal of that 
very power” (p. 72).   
Todd (2009) has found great utility in this aporia: “I find this ‘not yet’ quality of the universal to be precisely 
what propels us forward, giving us hope to do more, to do better, to do otherwise” (p. 22). I agree, and I think it is 
helpful to further reify the notion of the “not yet” via the notion of irony, as Hacking (1999) has described it: irony is 
the recognition that a particular truth claim, concept, or idea is strictly contingent on—and a product of—social 
history and forces, and yet something we must acknowledge as part of the universe that contains ourselves, other 
people, and the material world. In this case, we can imagine that idea is universalism. The ironist acknowledges the 
radical contingency of our vocabularies, and thus, I argue, the ubiquity of translation from the seemingly most 
universal concept all the way down to its necessarily particular instantiations. Nonetheless, our contingent 
vocabularies are all we have, and so long as we consciously maintain a degree of irony while we work with them, I 
think we can be said to manifest authenticity. To do otherwise—to recognize only the contingency or only the 
reality—would render us impotent or heavy-handed, respectively.  
In a similar vein, Critchley (2012) operationalized the aporia in a useful way, developing his formulation of 
fictional force as precisely the response (if not the solution, per se) to self-contradictory riddles of politics, which to 
my mind maps onto our paradox of universalism. For Critchley, due to the contradictions that comprise them, 
politics and law (and, by extension, universals) are all fictions, albeit necessary ones. Accordingly, he has posited a 
crucial distinction between fiction and supreme fiction, thus fighting contradiction with contradiction: 
“Paradoxically, a supreme fiction is a fiction that we know to be a fiction—there being nothing else—but in which 
we nevertheless believe. A supreme fiction is one self-conscious of its radical contingency” (p. 91). In a sense, then, 
if we follow these philosophical prescriptions, we are never allowed the comfort of getting off the treadmill. We 
know we are chasing the carrot, but what other choice do we have? 
There is a further caveat to all of this, which Popper (1994) has illustrated nicely. He warned that frameworks, 
vocabularies, and theories can become mental prisons if we become entrenched in any one of them. The process of 
dialogue, of critically engaging with other ideas, is advanced as a method for avoiding incarceration in any one such 
prison, a method we have seen put forward by Todd, Crossley, and others. But Popper has illuminated the 
complexities of abstract reification/concrete abstraction built into this prescription: “It is only too obvious that this 
idea of self-liberation, of breaking out of one’s prison of the moment, might in its turn become part of a framework 
or a prison—or in other words, that we can never be absolutely free” (p. 53). Indeed, the postmodernist lens for 
which I advocate in this essay, or even Popper’s self-described orthodox adherence of unorthodoxy, might be one 
such prison. But as Popper has suggested, the best we can do, then, is to widen our prison and willfully strive to 
overcome the parochialism that we know has such potential for harm. 
Epistemic Responsibility 
Building on the phenomenologically foundational element of translation, I have defended a sort of perspectivism 
that pervades all sociological arenas of abstraction, from individual, embodied perceptions of material objects, 
through to ideas, all the way up to “elevator words”—like truth, knowledge, and reality—which are not words for 
things in the world, but words that describe things we say about the world and which are circularly defined and 
universalized (Schmaus, n.d.; Hacking, 1999). This particularism undermines the logical grounds for all universals, 
even those centered on basic, visceral phenomena like “suffering” and “happiness,” rendering them mere 
holograms—flashy figures spouting platitudes from a hall of smoke and mirrors. It is not just that these words 
necessarily mean different things to different people; the key here, I believe, is to recognize the distinctiveness of 
even the most basically conceptualized experiences on an individual level, as this ensures a constant reflexivity and 
healthy skepticism about all claims made in the name of others. This does not mean that we should fail to intervene 
when obvious forms of cruelty and injustice are happening before our eyes, crimes against humanity that should be 
difficult, if not impossible, to defend through any form of critical dialogue. However, any such cosmopolitan 
intervention must be embedded in “a process and practice of contestation, a politics waged against the very forms of 
domination and false universals that seek to co-opt it” (Ingram, 2016, p. 72), and thus be waged from below, by 
unique embodied individuals, in grassroots fashion.  
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I contend that where good science meets good philosophy, we find postmodernism. Meanwhile, Bazzul (2016) 
has asserted that the best interests of the planet are served by society’s recognition that “reality” (e.g., science and 
human nature) and “dreams” (e.g., philosophy and ethics)—the actual and virtual—are “hopelessly entangled” (p. 
25), and Adams St. Pierre (2011) has warned that “attempts to disentangle science and philosophy are always 
dangerous” (p. 614). Enslin and Tjiattas (2009b) developed a “qualified universalism” in their defense of universal 
access to education and in so doing grounded a bold philosophical claim in a specious scientific one. Accordingly, I 
feel that the authors’ self-proclaimed philosophical agnosticism, their “self-evident” call for universal education, 
was irresponsible. It appears these authors have locked themselves in a mental prison, and a healthy dose of irony—
an appreciation for the supremely fictive essence of universalism—would engender a greater appreciation for the 
potential neocolonialism espoused by their universalist claims. Enslin and Tjiattas (2009b), and Pendlebury and 
Enslin (2001), have been compelled by Martha Nussbaum’s talk of universal capacities of agency and choice. What 
they all have seemed to ignore, however, is that to introduce certain alternatives can, in actuality, preclude all 
choice.  
Morarji (2010) provided an example of this, drawing on her ethnographic research in a rural mountain region 
of Northern India to suggest that discourses of universal education may be complicit with a vision of development 
that coerces market participation and radically marginalizes agriculture and rural life:  
Education is widely perceived as a way out of rural backwardness into the modern economy. Yet my 
research indicates that not only do desirable choices often fail to materialize, but education reproduces rural 
decline by closing off cultural and material options for rural communities. (p. 51, italics in original) 
Furthermore, much of this impetus is social, as many of the young people in her study were pressured by parents 
who were largely illiterate and uneducated to pursue education as a way to allay embarrassment and foment pride. 
However inadvertent, Enslin and Tjiattas’(2009b) pillar of universal education has contributed to this culture of 
alienation, “in which agriculture and rural life are inevitably residual, unfeasible and a compulsion rather than a 
rational choice” (Morarji, p. 51).   
Neoliberal forms of education, then, with their tantalizing, overblown promises of prosperity and 
empowerment, might be irresistible to young peasants in Jaunpur, as well as their parents. But as Morarji’s research 
showed, an exodus from rural areas to urban centers can spell the death of Indigenous knowledge systems and create 
a population of educated but unemployed young adults who lack the basic skills to return to the simple, yet fruitful 
lives of subsistence farming they otherwise would have had. In the particular case of access to formal education in 
this region of rural India, “compulsions experienced as aspirations stem from experiences of marginalization rather 
than representing ‘natural’ values and choices” (Morarji, p. 58). Universal education, then, may be an inadvertent 
call for universal exploitation. Or perhaps not. Or perhaps both yes and no. Regardless, these are the contingencies 
that I believe are more readily interrogated via a postmodernist lens of reflexivity and incredulity, by wedding the 
so-called truths of science with the radical doubts of philosophy. Ethical researchers have an epistemic responsibility 
(Code, 1987) to know better than to gamble all their chips on universalist ideals without hedging their bets.  
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